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Abstract After 2010, the UK Government’s espousal
of a Localist agenda reflected a rejection of the regional
level as the most appropriate scale for sub-national gover-
nance. The development of a more explicitly city regional
level of governance is illustrated in the creation of City
Deals which have given some of England’s largest cities
increased autonomy to allocate the dividend of local eco-
nomic growth. More recently, Combined Authorities have
been formed, within which larger city-regions such as
Manchester, Sheffield, Leeds, Liverpool and the North-
East of England have been tasked to undertake transport,
economic development and other functions. In assessing
this contemporary reshaping of metropolitan governance
this article draws upon political economy, spatial and insti-
tutional approaches that highlight how austerity, competing
spatial imaginaries and the historical evolution of central-
local relationships within the UK state have combined to
produce a particularly ‘disorganised’ approach to contem-
porary devolution in England. It contends that while the
city region remains the dominant spatial narrative, the on-
going process of rescaling at the sub-national state level
falls well short of being a coherent, clearly thought-out and
Prof. Dr. Keith Shaw
keith.shaw@northumbria.ac.uk
 Prof. Dr. Mark Tewdwr-Jones
mark.tewdwr-jones@newcastle.ac.uk
1 Department of Social Science and Languages, Sutherland
Building, Northumbria University, Newcastle upon
Tyne, NE1 8ST, UK
2 School of Architecture Planning and Landscape, Claremont
Tower, Newcastle University, Claremont Road, Newcastle
upon Tyne, NE1 7RU, UK
permanent transfer of powers and fiscal responsibilities to
a uniformly defined scale of governance.
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„Desorganisierte Devolution“: die Umgestaltung
metropolitaner Governance in England in einer
Phase der Austerität
Zusammenfassung Die Förderung der lokalen Ebene
durch die Regierung des Vereinigten Königreichs nach
2010 zeigt eine Ablehnung der Region als die angemessene
Ebene für subnationale Governance. Die Entwicklung ei-
ner eindeutigeren stadtregionalen Governance-Ebene wird
verdeutlicht in den sogenannten City Deals, die es eini-
gen englischen Großstädten ermöglichen, die Dividende
des lokalen Wirtschaftswachstums mit größerer Autono-
mie zu verteilen. In letzter Zeit wurden im Rahmen der
Combined Authorities größere Stadtregionen wie Man-
chester, Sheffield, Leeds, Liverpool und Nordost-England
mit Aufgabenstellungen wie Verkehr und Wirtschaftsent-
wicklung beauftragt. Bei der Auswertung dieser aktuellen
Umgestaltung der metropolitanen Governance bezieht sich
der Beitrag auf volkswirtschaftliche, räumliche und insti-
tutionelle Ansätze und zeigt, wie die Kombination von
Austerität, konkurrierenden räumlichen Wahrnehmungen
und der historischen Evolution der zentralen-lokalen Bezie-
hungen in UK ein besonderes „desorganisiertes“ Vorgehen
bei der gegenwärtigen Devolution in England hervorbringt.
Die Ansicht wird vertreten, dass solange die Stadtregion
das dominante räumliche Narrativ bleibt, der fortlaufende
Prozess der Umskalierung auf der subnationalen Ebene
bei weitem nicht einer klar konzipierten und dauerhaften
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Übertragung von Befugnissen und fiskalen Zuständigkeiten
an eine einheitlich definierte Governance-Ebene entspricht.
Schlüsselwörter Devolution · Governance · Region ·
Stadt · Wirtschaft
1 Introduction: The Demise of The Dual Polity
According to Bulpitt (1983) in his seminal work “Territory
and Power”, for much of the 20th century the UK political
system could be viewed as a ‘dual polity’. While central
government dealt with the ‘high’ politics of foreign policy,
defence and the economy, local government was responsi-
ble for the ‘low’ politics of local service delivery in areas
such as schools, roads and refuse collection. A key feature
of these arrangements was that, for the most part, central
elites kept out of local administration and let elected coun-
cils deal with local issues in their own way (Bulpitt 1983).
From the mid-1970s, however, the onset of UK economic
decline and, more recently, global recession has heralded
the incorporation of the local state into ‘high’ politics, as
the attempts of a generation of Westminster governments
to modernise public services, reform the welfare state and
control local public spending have led to ever-tighter cen-
tral control. Thus, in the contemporary context, this has
led to charges that (despite the UK government’s claims
to support devolving powers downwards) the acceptance of
the austerity agenda has ensured – in practice – interven-
tions that reshape and redirect local provision in order to
meet the needs of the centre (Haughton/Deas/Hincks et al.
2016).
The demise of the dual polity, in which local admin-
istration in the UK was largely viewed as parochial and
mundane when compared to the ‘high’ affairs of the cen-
tral state, is also seen in the increasing importance of the
‘local’, not just as a target of centrally-imposed social and
economic restructuring but also as a tier of governance open
to the possibilities of rescaling of administrative and politi-
cal boundaries. While structures of local governance at the
metropolitan and county/shire level were fixed for much of
the 20th century, a number of structural changes at the re-
gional level since the 1960s (including planning councils,
government offices and development agencies) proved to
be less permanent additions to UK sub-national governance
(Shaw/Robinson 2012). The absence of an effective tier of
governance between the centre and the local led to debates
on the ‘missing middle’ in English governance, which in-
creasingly identified the city-region as a more appropriate
scale for policy integration and delivery than the region.
More recently, the policy debate on sub-national gover-
nance within England has been further developed through
the focus of post-2010 Governments on devolving eco-
nomic and social responsibilities down to cities and their
wider sub-regions through a raft of different mechanisms in-
cluding city deals, devolution deals, combined authorities
and directly-elected mayors (House of Commons 2015a;
House of Commons 2015b). The post-2015 UK Govern-
ment have also responded to concerns about the growing
North-South divide by calling for the development of a pan-
regional Northern Powerhouse, through which the three
Northern Regions in England may work together to pro-
mote economic growth (Osborne 2014). Further momen-
tum has been added by the need to ensure that other parts
of England are able to enjoy a devolution ‘dividend’, given
the granting of more powers to Scotland following the 2014
Independence Referendum.
The contemporary relevance of how sub-national gover-
nance should be reshaped has produced genuine political
debates over the nature and intentions of the devolution
process. This includes a focus on the scale of devolution,
the powers on offer in different metropolitan areas, the link
between cities and their suburban hinterlands, how any new
structures should be governed, and the extent to which Cen-
tral Government could – and should – impose its devolution
model on local councils (RSA/City Growth Commission
2014; IPPR North 2014; Policy Network 2014; Wilcox/
Nohrová/Williams 2014). There is also a particular concern
that the attempt to empower local leaders in crafting locally-
defined and coordinated approaches to economic growth
and service delivery, “is being developed in the context of
unclear rationales, complex geographies, centre-local deal-
making, public sector restructuring and expenditure reduc-
tions” (Pike/MacKinnon/Coombes et al. 2016: 39).
In examining this particular phase in the reshaping of
sub-national governance in England, this article draws
upon the authors’ extensive previous research and wider
policy engagement on issues of sub-national governance
and urban planning (see for example Shaw/Robinson 2012;
Tewdwr-Jones 2012). This includes ongoing research on
the rescaling of economic governance in the North East of
England, in the light of greater Scottish autonomy (Shaw/
Robinson/Blackie 2014; Shaw 2015), and on enhancing
the role of higher educational institutions in city-regional
economic growth (Tewdwr-Jones/Goddard/Cowie 2015;
Goddard/Tewdwr-Jones 2016). The aim in this article
is to draw upon insights from this body of work to in-
form the ongoing debates on the rescaling of city-regional
governance in England.
In particular, the article aims to offer a distinctive theo-
retical and conceptual framework through which to describe
and explain the contemporary changes in sub-national gov-
ernance in England. This approach firmly locates an un-
derstanding of the growing interest in city-regional sites of
governance within a political economy approach that high-
lights how the neo-liberal ‘austerity’ agenda produces pres-
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sures to enforce both fiscal retrenchment and the displacing
of responsibility down to the local level. As Peck (2012:
647) argues: “Devolved governance and downloaded re-
sponsibility have long been hallmarks of neoliberal rule.
Under conditions of systemic austerity, this phenomenon
of ‘scalar dumping’ is taking on new dimensions, as cities
are confronted with a succession of budgetary Hobson’s
choices [...]” Some cities will be able to muddle through
by cutting corners (and maybe the odd department), while
keeping the streetlights burning; for many others, ongo-
ing fiscal restraint, service retrenchment and public-private
workarounds seem set to reshape the operating environment
over the medium term.
However, despite this dominant structural imperative, it
can be argued that even in highly centralised systems, na-
tional government faces challenges in ensuring the com-
pliance of devolved administrations that have their own
democratic legitimacy, local power bases, administrative
resources, and local ‘know-how’ to draw upon. For Pike
and Tomaney (2009: 29), “local and regional actors are not
passive, nor do they merely respond to the initiatives of the
centre. Such actors attempt to develop and pursue strate-
gies shaped by history, and their national political economic
context”. Thus, in England, the city-regional scale has not
been simply imposed in a top-down manner. The promo-
tion of city-regional governance has also been aided by the
acceptance by metropolitan council leaders themselves of
the international orthodoxy that such a scale is more ef-
fectively attuned to dynamic economic growth within func-
tional/economic, as opposed to, spatial/administrative areas
(World Bank 2009). In addition, this agenda also provided
opportunities for some urban councils outside London to
promote their economic interests and devolution opportu-
nities under the auspices of the self-styled ‘unique and in-
fluential’ Core Cities network (Core Cities 2015). This
is not a new phenomenon: Harvey’s (1989) discussion of
‘urban entrepreneurialism’ highlighted how urban gover-
nance had shifted from local service delivery to more cre-
ative uses of local resources to boost local economic growth
through public-private partnerships. However, the increas-
ingly dominant narrative on the appropriateness of the city-
region scale for economic governance is a more recent pol-
icy driver.
Augmenting this political economy emphasis with a fo-
cus on the institutional features of the UK state also allows
us to suggest that any process of rescaling economic sub-na-
tional governance remains highly contingent, as “states and
state spaces are not natural pre-given formations, but are
constructed, imagined and contested entities” (Haughton/
Deas/Hincks et al. 2016: 359). Thus, in the UK, while the
city region remains the dominant spatial narrative, the on-
going process of rescaling the sub-national state falls well
short of being a coherent, clearly thought-out and perma-
nent transfer of powers and fiscal responsibilities to a uni-
formly defined scale of governance. At present, it amounts
to a number of overlapping and even competing ‘spatial
imaginaries’ being proposed for subnational governance in
England including communities and localities, cities, city-
regions, county sub-regions and even pan-regions (National
Audit Office 2015; House of Commons 2016; National Au-
dit Office 2016).
Indeed, in assessing the approach to devolution within
England, this article highlights its predominantly ‘disorgan-
ised’ nature. Through this perspective, the approach can be
viewed as less than a deliberate and considered rescaling
strategy – motivated by the need for deficit reduction – than
as an “ad hoc, incremental, piecemeal and rapid” process
(Pike/Kempton/Marlow et al. 2016: 13). Thus, the poli-
tics of the contemporary devolution agenda in England is
characterised by the emergence of different scalar alterna-
tives reflecting a jumble of multiple and competing motives
in a traditionally centralised polity that has recently had to
respond to the political ramifications of a much more pow-
erful Scotland, and even the potential break-up of the UK.
The structure of the article is organised around three
sections. It commences with an examination of how the
city-regional framework emerged as an important policy
agenda – alongside the regional and pan-regional scales –
for the post-1997 Labour Governments. The second sec-
tion of the article then captures the mix of different spatial
imaginaries associated with the post-2015 Government’s
asymmetrical approach to devolution, focusing in detail on
recent attempts to develop devolution deals and Combined
Authorities. In doing so, it considers the continuing ten-
sions between different scales, particularly focusing on the
central state’s espousal of both ‘localism’ and ‘austerity’
as policy agendas, despite their inherent contradictions. It
concludes by arguing that the eventual impact of this form
of disorganised devolution is difficult to ascertain, given its
incoherent and contradictory nature. However, the ‘messi-
ness’ of the process may serve to expand central control
over sub-national economic development while also offer-
ing some space for local initiative and, albeit constrained,
autonomy.
2 A Scalar Shift: The Emergence of Metropolitan
Governance Under New Labour 1997–2010
The re-emergence of a political concern with a wider fo-
cus on the governance of metropolitan areas is particularly
associated with the devolution agenda of the New Labour
Government after 1997. The devolution agenda was very
wide-ranging, covering devolution to Scotland, Wales and
Northern Ireland, introducing directly-elected governance
in London and the creation of a regional tier in the other
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parts of England. It also kick-started the debate on the
need for governance of what contemporary policy-makers
referred to as the ‘city-region’. The concept, which was first
used in academic circles in the 1950s, refers to “a strate-
gic and political level of administration and policy-making,
extending beyond the administrative boundaries of single
urban local government authorities to include urban and/or
semi-urban hinterlands; this definition includes a range of
institutions and agencies representing local and regional
governance that possess an interest in urban and/or eco-
nomic development matters that, together, form a strategic
level of policy-making intended to formulate or implement
policies on a broader metropolitan scale” (Tewdwr-Jones/
McNeill 2000: 131). However, the initial phase of New
Labour’s devolution agenda in England after 1997 concen-
trated on the regional level, and involved the creation of
Regional Spatial Strategies (Swain/Baden 2012) and power-
ful appointed public bodies, Regional Development Agen-
cies, (RDAs), which covered large areas such as the West
Midlands, the North West, and the North East of England
(Robson/Peck/Holden 2000).
While the creation of new regional structures in this pe-
riod reflected emerging concerns about inter-regional eco-
nomic disparities and the lack of a regional voice within
the UK regions, wider European debates on regionalism
and territorial cohesion were also of importance. One im-
portant ‘push’ factor, which gave momentum to the creation
of English regional administrative structures, was the EU’s
shift, after 1989, to a regional approach to structural funds.
For one observer, the: “requirements of reform of the struc-
tural funds, particularly in relation to regional programming
and regional partnerships, provided the major push for ac-
tivity at the English regional level in this period. Despite
the steering role of central government, EU cohesion policy
reinforced the standard regions as the ‘official’ boundaries
and created embryonic regional networks in England that
provided something for the Labour government to build
on from 1997” (Bache 2005: 10). In abolishing regional
structures and their funding streams after 2010, the Conser-
vative-dominated Coalition Government was both substan-
tially reducing the financial and human resources that could
be devoted to sub-national economic development and ef-
fectively demolishing the strategic planning role that had
begun to integrate economic and spatial planning within an
RDA-led integrated planning process at the regional level
(Shaw/Robinson 2012).
The other strand of regional devolution was to encourage
the creation of elected regional assemblies (regional parlia-
ments) that would see elected regional politicians becom-
ing responsible for such areas as economic development,
spatial planning, EU funding, housing, culture and sport
(Sandford/McQuail 2001). However, this latter initiative
was effectively derailed in 2004 by the large ‘No’ vote in
the referendum on a directly-elected regional assembly for
the North East region of England (the first of eight probable
referenda in different parts of England), when many citizens
in that region were less than impressed with the creation of –
what many regarded as – an unnecessary tier of governance
(Shaw/Robinson 2007). In general, it became increasingly
clear that “regions don’t make a lot of economic sense, they
often capture multiple economies. By comparison, city re-
gions cover the functional economy of a place – the area
in which people commute to, shop and move house, and
where businesses connect with each other [...] City regions
are more attuned to the preferences of their residents [...]
and more democratically accountable. Their leadership is
drawn from the council leaders of the local authorities in-
volved, and – in the future – they may be led by a directly-
elected executive” (Larkin 2010: 3).
The closing down of the regional assembly option served
as a catalyst for the re-emergence of a city region agenda
which both filled a policy vacuum, and seemed to offer
more tangible economic, administrative and political ad-
vantages for policy-makers. In England, the contemporary
case for city regions was first advocated in a report for the
New Local Government Network in 2000. In considering
whether there was a ‘missing middle’ in English Gover-
nance, the report argued that – despite the setting up of
RDAs – the Government should consider whether city re-
gions with new governance arrangements provide a more
effective level for co-ordinating and delivering economic
development (NLGN 2000).
Following the outcome of the North East regional ref-
erendum in 2004, such a view increasingly attracted sup-
port from within the UK Government. In 2006, the UK
Treasury confirmed that, “there is significant empirical ev-
idence to suggest that the co-ordination of economic poli-
cies across the city-region is conducive to economic per-
formance” (HM Treasury 2006: 13). The council leaders
of a number of key cities outside of London, such as Birm-
ingham, Sheffield, Leeds, Nottingham and Newcastle, were
also emerging as strong advocates for greater devolution to
metropolitan areas (Core Cities 2002). Indeed, over the last
15 years, this ‘Core Cities’ Group has become an increas-
ingly influential network (Core Cities 2015). Evidence, per-
haps, of the influence of a more pragmatic argument that
the focus on devolution within England could also provide
a useful counter-balance to the dominance of London and
the South East.
The interest in city regions at this time also reflected
the growing body of national and international academic
research that highlighted their importance as “locomotives
of the national economies within which they are situated”
(Scott/Storper 2003: 581), and as the “ideal scale for policy
interventions” (Rodríguez-Pose 2009: 50). While for Turok
(2008: 153), city regions “fit closely with the focus on
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indigenous economic development and innovation at the
sub-national level, and offer the opportunity of capturing the
economic benefits of agglomeration through coordinated
planning transport and housing”.
Similarly, one account of the economic performance of
European cities highlighted that the best performing urban
centres were those where their political and administrative
boundaries most closely matched the geography of the lo-
cal economy (Cheshire/Magrini 2009). International sup-
port for developing city regions in England was also pro-
vided by the OECD’s territorial review of the metropolitan
area of Newcastle, which argued that “the weak and frag-
mented governance structure in the North East suggests that
consolidating governance functions of local authorities and
strengthening governance capacity at the city region level
may be a good option” (OECD 2006: 12).
The emerging governmental consensus in the UK – on
rescaling at the level of the city region – was reflected in
the passing of the Local Democracy, Economic Develop-
ment and Construction Act in 2009. The Act provided
a legal framework within which metropolitan governance
on a city region basis could commence. At this early stage,
the new framework allowed the new city region bodies to
draw upon the council leaders of their constituent local
authorities, manage economic development, housing, and
transport activities across the wider city region, and enjoy
additional financial flexibility over capital funding. By the
final year of the Labour Government in 2009–10, two city
regions (West Yorkshire and Greater Manchester) were in
the running to be the first such statutory city-regional body.
Of the two, Greater Manchester was the most advanced
having agreed, locally, to set up a voluntary body covering
the wider metropolitan area – the Association of Greater
Manchester Authorities (AGMA) – as long ago as 1986.
The latter’s previous history of a long track record in joint
working across the separate councils – despite political dif-
ferences – proved crucial to the Government’s decision to
agree city region status (Tomaney/McCarthy 2015).
This period can be viewed as one in which a bewildering
variety of sub-national initiatives developed, and what one
observer referred to as “scalar messiness” (Harrison 2012:
1255), but which did establish the intellectual and political
rationale for a city region focus which was then taken up
by the post-2010 Conservative-dominated governments. It
also served to highlight some of the emerging challenges
inherent in developing governance structures at this partic-
ular scale. But three emerging problems in particular can
be associated with this stage of development.
First, while the Labour Government’s acceptance of
a ‘variable geometry’ of locally-constituted and voluntary
collaborative arrangements had the virtue of being flexible,
and allowing for arrangements that reflect local economic
circumstances, some areas unable to meet the demands
placed on them by government would miss out on the
potential benefits of state-assisted city regional develop-
ment. Indeed, the term ‘city region’ itself carries with it an
assumption that it is the interests of the larger cities that are
paramount, which tends to downplay the significance of
the support for larger free-standing towns or mixed urban-
rural areas that still face a number of economic challenges
(NLGN 2009). For Haughton, Deas, Hinks et al. (2016:
356) this is merely one example of a wider set of highly de-
batable economic assumptions that “privilege large global
cities as generators of economic growth” despite evidence
that “economic growth rates are higher in many of the
smaller cities of the UK and elsewhere in Europe”.
Secondly, the flexibility of the approach should not dis-
guise the strength of the national imperative in England.
If city regions did have some flexibility to respond to
their particular sub-regional economic challenges, it was
very much within the context of a national approach that
enshrines the dominance of a “growth-orientated national
economic policy over redistributive spatial policy” (Pike/
Tomaney 2009: 17). From this perspective, the agenda
can be viewed as a “top-down Treasury driven agenda,
focussed predominantly on enhancing economic productiv-
ity” (Ayres/Stafford 2009: 619).
Thirdly, in the context of what some commentators saw
as the growing ‘democratic deficit’ at the sub-national level,
where key decisions were taken in secret either by un-
elected officials or by the not directly-elected councillors
(Humphrey/Shaw 2004), Labour’s plans for city regions
raised issues of accountability and openness. As things
stood in 2010, there were no opportunities for voters to
democratically directly-elect any key decision-makers at
this scale of governance. This firmly suggests that there
remained uncertainty over the preferred governance model
to be introduced.
3 Post-2010 Developments: City Regions Under
Localism
Following the May 2010 General Election, the Conserva-
tive-dominated Coalition Government’s approach to sub-
national governance promised a greater ‘Localist’ empha-
sis on devolving power down to local authorities and local
people. The rationale for the change was summed up in
the 2011 Localism Act: “The Government is committed to
passing new powers and freedoms to town halls. We think
that power should be exercised at the lowest practical level
– close to the people who are affected by decisions, rather
than distant from them. Local authorities can do their job
best when they have genuine freedom to respond to what
local people want, not what they are told to do by central
government” (DCLG 2011a: 4).
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The focus on localism explicitly rejected the previous
Labour Government’s emphasis on the regional scale of
governance. Indeed, the Conservatives were hostile to the
regional tier on principle – considering it “unwieldy, in-
terfering, and more concerned with fussy structures than
actual job creation” (Kelly 2011: 4). Thus, the new admin-
istration removed an entire tier of regional organisations,
notably the nine Regional Development Agencies (RDAs)
and Government Offices for the Regions (GOs) and, effec-
tively, sounded the death-knell for regionalism in England
(Shaw/Robinson 2012). To inject a measure of account-
ability into sub-national governance, the Government also
reinforced their belief in the new role of ‘strong and power-
ful’ directly-elected executive mayors at the local level who
would lead councils, rather than the existing local leaders,
who were – first and foremost – ward councillors inter-
nally selected from within the majority party caucus (DCLG
2011b).
Given the highly centralised culture of the British state
and the perceived need to impose budget reductions on sub-
national governments, it is not surprising that some critics
interpreted the post-2010 approach to devolution as “cen-
trally-orchestrated localism” (Pike/Kempton/Marlow et al.
2016: 10). With the post-2010 Government’s neo-liberal
focus on ‘rolling back the state’, the ideological signifi-
cance of localism may also lie in its ability to shift respon-
sibility for cuts in service provision away from the central,
and towards the local level. In a similar way, the closely
related emphasis on the Big Society, may have had a sim-
ilar intention, this time with the additional emphasis on
the so-called ‘empowering’ of the voluntary and commu-
nity sectors masking how the adoption of a “market-based
model for reforming public services, further concentrat[ed]
power in the hands of new ‘quasi-monopoly’ private sec-
tor providers rather than in those of local people” (Civil
Exchange 2015: 6).
In terms of proposals to rescale sub-national governance,
the new Government continued with the strand of thinking
that had characterised the last years of the previous gov-
ernment, namely the devolution of responsibilities to larger
cities and their wider sub-regions. The three major pol-
icy developments that reflected this focus after 2010 are:
Local Enterprise Partnerships, City Deals, and Combined
Authorities.
3.1 Local Enterprise Partnerships
In place of the RDAs after 2010, the Government cre-
ated 39 sub-regional Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs)
across England. These new bodies were independent of
local government, non-statutory, lacked the legal powers
open to RDAs, were much ‘leaner’ in terms of staffing, and
had greatly reduced budgets (Pugalis/Bentley 2013). In
bringing together both local political and business leaders
to enable a more private sector-led approach to economic
growth, LEPs reflected the emphasis of the new Govern-
ment on reducing public sector-led growth in favour of
a more market-led approach (House of Commons 2013).
It was also highlighted that the new partnerships should
“better reflect the natural economic geography of the areas
they serve and hence cover real functional economic and
travel to work areas” (BIS/CLG 2010: 2).
From this perspective, they were potentially more
aligned geographically with the non-implemented Red-
cliffe-Maud proposals of 1969, extending beyond indi-
vidual urban local government boundaries. Resources for
the individual LEPs came via a new Local Growth Fund
worth £1 bn and were allocated on the basis of the quality
of LEPs’ economic plans. Areas that were deemed by
government to have the strongest plans would get a greater
share of the funding. This element – of differential reward
– has also been underpinned by the Government’s empha-
sis on the importance of creativity, innovation and taking
risks when promoting city growth (HM Government 2011).
However, such an approach also runs the risk of exacer-
bating already-ingrained processes of uneven development
between English cities as it is likely to shift resources away
from economically under-performing areas with high levels
of social need (Martin/Gardiner/Tyler 2014).
In their relatively short life, the 39 LEPs in England
have received, at best, a lukewarm response. The criti-
cal assessment has included concerns over their insufficient
powers and resources to achieve their aims, variable arbi-
trary and transitory territorial boundaries that have at least
as much to do with political ‘fixes’ as economic analysis
and their lack of long-term vision and dynamism (Deas/
Hincks/Headlam 2013; Pugalis/Bentley 2013). One recent
critical account of LEP performance highlights how such
concerns are the product of continuing internal tensions
between centralism and localism, competition and collab-
oration, agility and “bureaucratisation and wider external
challenges including state austerity, faltering growth and
uncertain economic conditions in the short- and medium-
term” (Pike/Marlow/McCarthy et al. 2015).
3.2 City Deals
The Localism Act 2011 gave ministers the power to transfer
responsibilities to individual cities that came forward with
innovative proposals to promote economic growth. This
‘City Deal’ process would see, in exchange for being
granted greater powers, English cities and their wider ar-
eas assuming responsibility for delivering growth locally
(National Audit Office 2015). This approach reinforced the
principle of ‘asymmetrical devolution’, which sees differ-
ent combinations of powers allocated to different cities or
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areas. This marks a clear shift from traditional approaches
to sub-national governance in England, which tended to
impose similar devolved arrangements on to a variety of
metropolitan areas in the time-honoured tradition of ‘one
size fits all’. The Government were also flexible in how
cities interpreted the size of the area within which devo-
lution would occur: “The Government is committed to
devolving powers and resources to the most appropriate
level. In some cases this will be individual local author-
ities, but in others it will make sense for decisions to be
made at a level which matches the economic geography
of a city (broadly the area covered by the LEP). We will
take a bespoke approach, agreeing on a case-by-case basis
the spatial level at which decisions should be made, and
the governance structures that need to be in place” (HM
Government 2011: 8).
The first wave of City Deals covered the eight largest
cities (including Manchester, Birmingham and Newcastle)
that were in the Core Cities Group. A further, second,
wave of 20 City Deal agreements then encompassed the
next 14 largest cities, plus the six cities with the highest
population growth between 2001 and 2010. These included
smaller city regions such as Greater Cambridge, Oxford
and Oxfordshire, Tees Valley, and Hull and the Humber
(Cabinet Office 2013). The flexible nature of the process
saw ministers offering a selection of different devolved re-
sponsibilities from which the cities could choose (see HM
Government 2011: 8 f.):
● Giving cities one single capital pot (rather than multiple
funding streams), allowing them the freedom to direct
and prioritise economic investment.
● Access to an additional £1 bn Regional Growth Fund
(RGF) to support innovative and ambitious economic
programmes.
● Powers for cities to offer business rate discounts to lo-
cal businesses, with the opportunity to match fund this
through Growth Fund bids.
● Allowing cities to take strategic transport decisions by
devolving local transport major funding.
● Increasing cities’ control over rail services, through de-
volving responsibility for commissioning local and/or re-
gional rail services, including the management of fran-
chise arrangements.
● Developing with cities specific proposals for developing
greater accountability to local communities for local bus
services, in the context of wider Bus Service Operators
Grant reform.
● Putting greater regeneration funding and responsibilities
in the hands of cities, by devolving Homes and Commu-
nities Agency spending and functions.
● Creating a City Skills Fund to enable cities and colleges
to work together to tailor the provision of adult skills to
the needs of employers in the city.
● Supporting the development of connected urban spaces
through a £100 million capital fund for competitive bids
for ambitious broadband infrastructure plans, including
those enhancing superfast broadband to strategic busi-
ness areas and high-speed mobile connectivity.
● Giving cities the opportunity to grow apprenticeship
numbers in their area by establishing City Apprentice-
ship Hubs, accessing national funding to catalyse new
apprenticeships in small businesses.
While there were similarities, in practice, relating to
the devolved responsibilities prioritised by cities (includ-
ing common areas such as skills, transport and freeing-
up investment funding), other areas were less likely to be
selected (such as housing), while bids also advocated us-
ing the new responsibilities to boost growth in different
ways. Thus, Newcastle City Council wished to create a joint
Accelerated Development Zone with Gateshead Council,
Greater Manchester favoured the creation of a Graphene
Global Research and Technology Hub, while Sunderland’s
application asked for support for developing an Interna-
tional Advanced Manufacturing Park (Cabinet Office 2013).
There has been recent confirmation that the English model
of City Deals has been explicitly adopted within the centre-
right Australian Government’s new cities programme (Dole
2016). This is evidence, perhaps, of how the wider neo-lib-
eral focus on enabling private sector-led economic growth
involves the central state re-regulating the nature of eco-
nomic development at the local level (Peck 2012).
The permissiveness of the process did allow some cities
to put forward applications based on different geographies.
While the majority were firmly based on the wider city
region, i. e. the urban core and its hinterland, included
a number of different councils and were coterminous with
LEP boundaries, others were more circumscribed and ap-
plied to a smaller number of local councils. For example,
the Greater Manchester City Deal covered 10 local author-
ities in the wider metropolitan area, while the Newcastle
bid only covered the city council and its near neighbour,
Gateshead Council. Indeed, two other councils adjoining
Newcastle and Gateshead – Sunderland and South Tyne-
side – were to have their own City Deal accepted. Whereas
in Nottingham, the original City Deal covered only one
authority, the City Council (National Audit Office 2015),
this was also the case with Southend Council’s application
(Cabinet Office 2013).
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3.3 Combined Authorities
A third strand of policy, which emphasised a focus on
the wider metropolitan area or city region (and which is
closely related to the two above), has been the development
of Combined Authorities. As noted earlier, this approach
was first mooted under the previous Labour Government
(1997–2010), and it was left to the Coalition Government
to create these bodies as legal structures, with approved
functions in relation to economic development and trans-
port, and with specified governance arrangements (House
of Commons 2015a).
Combined Authorities can best be viewed as provid-
ing a city-region with a joint-working legal framework
through which elements of devolution already agreed via
City Deals and/or directed through LEPs, can be imple-
mented, co-ordinated, and legitimated. They sit across the
existing local government structures but only exist as the
councils’ own creations. However, the exact relationship
between these three policy developments does, somewhat
confusingly, vary across the different metropolitan areas
– one practical implication of asymmetrical devolution. In
Greater Manchester, the City Deal, LEP and Combined Au-
thority all cover the same boundaries, while in the former
North East region, there are three different City Deals, two
LEPs and two Combined Authorities. The North East Com-
bined Authority covers seven councils in the north of the
area, while the Tees Valley Combined Authority covers five
councils in the south of the region.
The Government’s approach to Combined Authorities
has also developed over time with a number of iterations.
The first model (approved in 2011), and with its own eco-
nomic development and transport duties, was that of the (ten
council) Greater Manchester Combined Authority. This
grouping was by far the most advanced metropolitan area
Table 1 Further devolution to the Greater Manchester Combined Authority (GMCA) – July 2015
Policy Sector Responsibility
Land GMCA will create a Greater Manchester Land Commission to co-ordinate how publically-owned
land can be used to support the building of 10,000 new homes a year
Planning GMCA will create a Mayoral Development Corporation which can help drive regeneration and
advance complex development schemes
Fire The directly-elected Mayor will oversee the work of Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service
Children’s Services The GMCA and the government will work together to review where children’s services – both those
delivered by councils and other providers – can be better integrated and be more efficient
Employment and Skills Devolution arrangements had already given Greater Manchester influence over 40 per cent of skills
training delivered in the area. In this new agreement the government has committed to explor-
ing how the city region can have greater flexibility in commissioning employment and skills pro-
grammes
Health and social care The government has pledged that Greater Manchester’s Strategic Sustainability Plan will now be
more closely aligned with the Spending Review process for health and social care, enabling greater
certainty as funding levels will be known for a longer period than is currently the case
The GMCA covers the ten metropolitan boroughs which formerly made up the metropolitan county of Greater Manchester: Manchester, Salford,
Stockport, Tameside, Trafford, Wigan, Bolton, Bury, Rochdale, and Oldham. Source: based on GMCA (2015)
in its joint-working – having already gained strong local
agreement before it was formally established by Govern-
ment.
In 2014, Combined Authorities were also formally estab-
lished in five other sub-regions (West Yorkshire, Sheffield,
Liverpool, Tees Valley, and the North East), with Greater
Manchester, at this stage, also being allowed to create
a statutory spatial development plan, have a delegated and
integrated transport budget, bus franchising powers and
a substantial Housing Investment Fund (Colomb/Tomaney
2016).
Following the May 2015 General Election, the Con-
servative Government further revised the approach by an-
nouncing an additional ‘Devolution Deal’ which allowed
the existing combined bodies to ask for additional respon-
sibilities as long as they agreed to accept the introduction
of a directly-elected mayor for their Combined Authority.
In addition, the range of possible devolution opportunities
was extended to encompass economic development, regen-
eration, housing, transport, skills, the integration of health
and social care, aspects of children’s services, land devel-
opment and planning, taking over the work of Police and
Crime Commissioners, control over the fire and rescue ser-
vices, and retaining the surplus generated by business rate
growth (House of Commons 2015b). For example, under
the expanded deal in Greater Manchester (again, the first
body to be approved under the additional ‘deal’), the role
of the elected mayor would be to lead the Greater Manch-
ester Combined Authority, chair its meetings and allocate
responsibilities to a cabinet made up of the leaders of each
of the ten councils. Councils in Greater Manchester that
currently control £5 bn of public money annually would
also be expected to gain control over a further £2 bn and
gain a greater range of responsibilities (Table 1).
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As eventually underpinned by powers within the 2016
Cities and Local Government Devolution Act, further devo-
lution deals covering wider city or sub-regions were agreed
in the autumn of 2015, including those with Combined Au-
thorities covering the Sheffield City, the North East, Tees
Valley, Liverpool, and the West Midlands. More recently
(in Spring 2016), the coverage of the approach was widened
to include more rural or mixed areas, including Greater Lin-
colnshire and East Anglia (Fig. 1).
There is also an additional spatial level to be consid-
ered. While seemingly encouraging a competitive ethos
between rival authorities/areas each with their own mix of
powers and resources, another spatial assemblage is emerg-
ing which highlights the potential for some form of co-op-
eration across the pan-regional scale. This covers both the
development of a Northern Powerhouse across the whole
north of England (Osborne 2014) and the more recent es-
pousal of a ‘Midlands Engine’ across 11 LEP areas in the
West and East Midlands.
In the case of the Northern Powerhouse initiative, there
had been an earlier attempt to encourage a pan-regional ap-
proach via the Northern Way initiative between 2004 and
2011. While lacking resources and strategic powers, the
initiative did encourage a culture of collaborative work-
ing, created a robust database covering a wider spatial level
and created a momentum that cities such as Manchester,
Sheffield and Liverpool could harness when promoting the
city region approach. In the case of the former, “whilst
the Northern Way as a spatial imaginary had emerged as
a contiguous pan-regional growth corridor, its colonisation
by Manchester allowed the city to further its city-regional
ambitions” (Haughton/Deas/Hincks et al. 2016: 362). This
approach may also fit within the direction of travel in Eu-
rope where the OECD has argued that the focus is moving
away from competing with neighbouring areas for particu-
lar opportunities, to co-optition which involves collaborat-
ing across borders to highlight propositions for investment:
“The real competition is global; therefore neighbouring re-
gions may need to engage in ‘co-optition’ – co-operation
for competition” (OECD 2013: 12 f.).
4 ‘Disorganised Devolution’: an Assessment
In comparison to the tentative early attempts to forge a new
approach to city regions prior to 2010, there is evidence
in recent years of a more concerted approach to devolving
powers and responsibilities downwards within England. It
can be argued that UK Central Government has recognised
(somewhat belatedly) that running everything from Lon-
don is unsustainable, and is offering a flexible, permissive
approach to devolution where councils bring forward their
own plans. While such plans require the agreement of Cen-
tral Government (‘Treasury sign-off’) they are crafted and
agreed by local councils to reflect their needs, and can en-
compass both economic and social interventions, the econ-
omy and society, economic growth and health and well-
being. As one recent account of central-local relations ar-
gues, “unusually for public service reform, the government
has eschewed a one-size-fits-all approach and developed
a strategy that not just tolerates, but actually celebrates,
local variation, and also allows for future iterations as con-
texts and priorities change” (Lowndes/Gardner 2016: 363).
The Government’s approach both allows for the closer
integration of administrative and functional economic
boundaries and also encourages collaboration across a much
wider metropolitan territory and, more recently, across ru-
ral or shire county areas. It also provides a boost for both
democracy and transparency by insisting on a directly-
elected mayor for the new Combined Authorities who is to
be directly responsible to voters for the performance of the
new authority.
There are also signs, within the Devolution Deals, of
a deliberate shift in power away from the LEPs to the di-
rectly elected mayor and the Combined Authority. In turn,
this would see the LEPs reporting more to the relevant city
region body rather than centrally to the central government
department for business. Finally, in the North of England in
particular, the supporting argument that such changes begin
to compensate English city regions for the granting of addi-
tional powers to Scotland, following the 2014 Independence
Referendum, has also been made (Shaw 2015).
However, a number of concerns over the disorganised
approach adopted since 2010 still remain. First, despite
being critical of Labour’s overly bureaucratic, and increas-
ingly complex approach to metropolitan governance prior to
2010, the increasingly piecemeal and inconsistent approach
adopted since then has produced a ‘patchwork quilt’ of dif-
ferent spatial imaginaries in which the exact relationship
and ‘fit’ between LEPs, City Deals, Growth Funds, Com-
bined Authorities and Devolution Deals (and the ‘award’
process itself) is at best confusing and at worst chaotic,
making accountability and transparency hard to achieve.
Partly, this reflects how the rejection of the ‘one-size fits
all’ approach works itself out on the ground and also the
tensions (‘turf-wars’) within the different Central Govern-
ment departments directly involved in sub-national issues.
Indeed, for much of the period under review, four de-
partments, the Treasury, Business, Communities and Lo-
cal Government (CLG) and the Cabinet Office were all
involved in aspects of the devolution process and, in the
case of City Deals in particular, considerably complicated
the decision-making process (Keeling 2013).
Secondly, adding to the complexity and ‘scalar messi-
ness’ is the Government’s (or more specifically, Chancel-
lor of the Exchequer George Osborne’s) focus on the idea
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Fig. 1 Devolution Deals
2015–2016. Source: National
Audit Office (2016: 18)
of a ‘Northern Powerhouse’, a pan-regional concept which
aims to rejuvenate the economic fortunes of the North West,
the North East, and Yorkshire. In a speech in Manchester in
June 2014, Osborne argued that the lack of economic and
physical connections between the cities and city regions of
the North of England was holding back their growth. In
order to challenge the dominance of London and the South
East, a ‘Northern Powerhouse’ should be created. “Not one
city, but a collection of northern cities – sufficiently close to
each other that combined they can take on the world” (Os-
borne 2014: 1). Mainly focusing on connectivity issues,
the Chancellor was able to include a number of transport
initiatives within this agenda, including the establishment
of a Transport for the North partnership, the £13 bn in-
vestment in high speed rail connections between the South
and the North (‘HS2’) and the West and the East (‘HS3’),
40 major road schemes, and an electronic ticketing ‘oys-
ter card’ system (similar to the one already operating in
London) that would allow ticketless public transport be-
tween the ‘powerhouse’ cities. Despite Osborne’s rhetoric,
however, many local and national politicians in the North
viewed the Powerhouse as a barely concealed political at-
tempt to strengthen the reputation of the Conservative Party
in the North of England, a rebranding of what is already on
offer via the Combined Authority deals, and little more than
government-backing for the growth of Greater Manchester
(Fitzgerald 2015). Indeed, there are real concerns elsewhere
in the North that the Manchester model (or ‘Devo Manc’ as
it has been christened) has been anointed by the UK Trea-
sury as the example to follow (Geoghegan 2014), and that
for other areas such as the North East, there is a little on
offer except kind words. The uncertainty over the North-
ern Powerhouse has been further intensified by the likely
reduction in EU funding available to the North of England
following the UK leaving the EU, and the disappearance –
from the UK Government – of George Osborne, the creator
and main advocate of the scheme (Hewitt 2016).
Thirdly, there are also concerns that the Conservative
Government’s increasingly selective approach gives the UK
Treasury the power to reward city regions that they feel pos-
sess the strategic vision and collaborative approach to gov-
ernance required to transform city-regional economies, and
refuse applications from other metropolitan areas deemed
not to have the economic potential and governance struc-
tures necessary. While such an approach can be seen as
establishing bespoke devolution deals with a small num-
ber of privileged city regions (Policy Network 2014), it
clearly also creates a two-paced route to devolution, “a com-
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Fig. 2 Changes in Council Spending Power 2014–2016. Source: Liverpool Express (2014)
plex, multi-speed system [...] combined with processes of
central government funding allocation [that] could reshape
and accentuate patterns of uneven economic development”
(Colomb/Tomaney 2016: 11). For one observer, business
rates reform on this basis would exacerbate inequality: “It’s
not a winner takes all system, but it’s a winner takes more”
(Tony Travers, quoted in The Guardian 2015).
To take one example, Westminster Council’s 235,000
population in Central London is able to benefit from the
council’s ability to collect £1.8 bn of business rates per
year from its vibrant business community, while the five
northern core cities (comprising 2.6 million residents) with
a less substantial business base are only able to currently
collect £1.3 bn in business rates (Marlow 2015). The previ-
ous Labour Government’s (albeit weak) focus on reducing
inequalities between regions seems a long time ago. In-
stead it has been firmly abandoned, and replaced by a –
predominantly neo-liberal – acceptance of the inevitability
of wide variations in the competition for scarce resources.
As a recent review of economic and social conditions in UK
cities has argued, the present approach “risks the creation
of a governance gap between cities that reinforces exist-
ing economic and social disparities. This gap will emerge
because cities experiencing relative decline have more lim-
ited economic potential, weaker tax bases, higher levels of
poverty and a greater need for public service provision”
(Pike/MacKinnon/Coombes et al. 2016: 43).
Finally, while devolution deals with major cities in Eng-
land chime with the Conservative Government’s espousal
of localism, these are taking place against a backdrop of
major cuts to the budgets of the individual local authori-
ties involved in the deals. The significant cuts, defined as
being essential in a period of austerity by the Government
(Lowndes/Pratchett 2012), have hit the core cities particu-
larly hard, with a major reduction in the total amount of
money (drawn from a range of sources) that these cities
have to spend compared to many councils in the South East
and to the English average. As noted in Fig. 2, between
2014 and 2016 the reductions ranged from 5.3 to 10.8 %.
The leader of Leeds City Council recently warned that the
council’s financial situation was becoming ‘near impossi-
ble’ as he announced a further cut of £45 million in the
2015–16 budget. This latest round means that, by March
2016, Leeds City core funding from Central Government
will have dropped more than 40 per cent in the last five
years (Leeds City Council 2015). Even in the most devel-
oped of the devolution deals in Greater Manchester, it is
estimated that the ten constituent local councils will have
lost £1.5 bn and over 10,000 jobs since 2010 (Fitzpatrick
2014).
The simultaneous pursuit of the ‘localist’ and ‘auster-
ity’ agendas by the Conservative Government has produced
a political parallel world for council leaders. In one world,
they are caught up in a crisis atmosphere having to make
difficult decisions on major staffing levels and public ser-
vice cuts in their own councils. While in another (at the
city regional level) the focus is on devolved powers, ac-
cess to new budgets and an atmosphere where there is talk
of growth and development. The key fault line – and the
dilemma facing council leaders in Greater Manchester – has
been described as “accepting central government pressure
to absorb expenditure cuts in return for the promise of addi-
tional powers and future funds that prove more modest than
anticipated and come with strings attached” (Haughton/
Deas/Hincks et al. 2016: 367). Indeed, the view that devo-
lution deals have been used by ministers as smokescreens
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to mask the scale of cuts to local councils was used by local
politicians in the Gateshead local authority area to justify
their refusal to join the North East Combined Authority
(Seddon 2016). This concern is reinforced by recent fig-
ures from the Audit Commission that, on a per capita basis,
the North East gets less funding than many of the other
Combined Authority areas (National Audit Office 2016).
5 Conclusions
With the election of the Labour Government in 1997, ques-
tions on the form of sub-national government re-emerged
and were instigated throughout the 2000s as commitments
to regionalism. But English regionalism was never fully
embraced publicly, neither by Labour’s own voters nor by
a Conservative Party who believed in more localist forms
of governing. Despite attempting to embed the forms of re-
gionalism into economic development and integrated plan-
ning strategies to address the specific needs of individual
city regions, formal regionalism was increasingly overtaken
by a renewed interest in city-regions. A new localism thus
emerged, promoted by metropolitan councils eager not only
to fill the post-regional vacuum, but also to demonstrate
their ability to run services and think strategically. After
2010, and the election of a Conservative-dominated Coali-
tion Government, regionalism was abandoned in favour of
a new commitment to localism, albeit one which was pro-
moted and instigated by central government. Localism, as
promoted by this latest phase of devolution, is about the
central state relinquishing duties to the local level, accom-
panied by a new commitment to an increasingly kaleido-
scopic form of city-regionalism.
The approach adopted in this article has drawn upon
political economy, spatial and institutional approaches that
highlight, inter-alia, how austerity, competing spatial imag-
inaries and the historical evolution of central-local relation-
ships within the UK state have produced a particularly ‘dis-
organised’ approach to contemporary devolution in Eng-
land. Such disorganisation is reflected in the “piecemeal ap-
proach of incremental reform, limited fiscal localisation and
bespoke arrangements” (Pike/MacKinnon/Coombes et al.
2016: 43). The disorganised nature of the approach, al-
though heavily shaped by the desire of the UK national
government to achieve a range of aims, including reducing
public expenditure, reforming public services, promoting
spatially-selective economic growth, and the promoting of
party political interests, is also partly influenced by more lo-
calist, bottom-up pressures. However, while local political
leaders, particularly (but not exclusively) at the city regional
level have helped shape devolution policy and will have
opportunities to shape resource allocation, it is still best
viewed as a form of “centrally-prescribed localism with the
rewards going to those who can dance most credibly to the
tune of central government” (Haughton/Deas/Hincks et al.
2016: 367). In addition, the process of deal-making itself
(with both centre and local politicians each with their own
agendas) “could lead to patchwork solutions, disadvantag-
ing localities without natural local linkages, in a context
where the principal of redistributing funding from prosper-
ous to poorer areas is being steadily eroded” (Lowndes/
Gardner 2016: 365).
Therefore recent changes in metropolitan governance in
England have been shaped by intense political debates on
both the appropriate scale and governmental structures re-
quired to deal with sub-national issues. The different pref-
erences reveal internal UK debates on the ongoing relation-
ships between different political tiers of the state but are also
affected by trends in global governance. Thus, the gover-
nance frame itself is not a static construct, even though it
comprises layers of institutions possessing differential roles
and power. Without any formal written constitutional set-
tlement setting out formal roles and responsibilities, the
UK governance system comprises a political process that
constantly re-layers governance, removes discretion from
some governmental scales, adds to others, and changes the
balance of relationships between the institutions. In the
absence of ‘one size fits all’ models for sub-national gov-
ernment, more ad hoc, informal and flexible approaches
emerge, ensuring different modes of governance in differ-
ent parts of England, evidence perhaps of the continuing
tension between decentralisation and territorial cohesion
(Tomaney/McCarthy 2015). Jessop (2000) has also talked
of these issues in relation to the shifting scales of power of
the state, and Agnew (1999) has referred to the jostling of
power between divergent forms of the state.
It is also contended that aspects of the ongoing, and
emerging, relationships between pre-existing and new
scalar politics of the state (MacKinnon 2011), form a con-
tested and malleable framework of territorial governance
and management (Haughton/Allmendinger/Counsell et al.
2010). Within this understanding of territorial governance,
different levels of government and new forms of governance
‘flex their muscles’ and claim ownership and responsibility
for policy and strategic coordination across – and within
– government, or sometimes even temporarily abandon it.
The overall determinants of how new forms of government
and governance ‘bed-down’ relate to a desire on the ground
to make sense and achieve some semblance of order out of
chaos, to achieve integration, and strategic delivery. With
the UK still reeling following the outcome of the June
2016 referendum on leaving the EU, and the resignations
of Prime Minister David Cameron and Chancellor George
Osborne, questions of what happens to sub-national gov-
ernance and its relationship to both the centre and other
nations is likely to occupy the minds of not only the new
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Theresa May government but also city regional politicians
and officials across England for some time to come.
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